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Abstract 
The implementation of funded afforestation, reforestation, sustainable forest management and 
avoided deforestation projects needs to be increased.  Implementation of such projects has the 
potential to deliver ecological benefits, social benefits and a means for reducing global green 
house gas emissions.  International and national carbon markets have led to an increase in 
funding opportunities available for forest carbon related projects.    Carbon credits have the 
potential to deliver desirable environmental outcomes along with a source of income to 
achieve such outcomes.  There are two types of markets creating carbon credits: compliance 
and voluntary markets.   While voluntary markets are responsible for the creating the 
majority of forest carbon credits the scientific legitimacy of credits created under such 
regimes has been called into question.  In comparison compliance carbon markets have 
attempted to address a number of issues such as permanence, leakage, double counting and 
additionality which in turn had led to the development of complex reporting accounting 
methodologies resulting in lower investment levels. 
Introduction 
Climate change has gained international and domestic status as a serious political issue.  The 
United Nations climate change regulatory framework was designed to provide parties with 
flexibility in methods of reducing their green house gas emissions.  This flexibility led to the 
creation of a number of market-based instruments (as oppose to traditional command and 
control type regulation).  These market based instruments encourage investment in practices 
which lower green house gas emissions.  The actions performed by forests in reducing green 
house gas emissions are included within these market based instruments.  Such mechanisms 
therefore have the potential to channel investment from climate change mitigation and 
adaptation activities to investment in forest projects.   
At the international level, there are two forms of carbon markets: those referred to as 
compliance markets and those referred to as voluntary markets.  Compliance markets are 
those markets operating under Kyoto regulation such as the European Union Emission 
Trading Scheme.  While voluntary markets are those markets operating outside this 
framework such as the Chicago Climate Change Exchange.1  Both of these markets have the 
potential to drive investment in sustainable forest use and management projects.    This paper 
will identify the market mechanisms of both compliance and voluntary markets of relevance 
to forest investment.  It will then examine the technical and policy barriers preventing further 
investment in forest projects funded through climate change investment.  Climate change 
investment in this paper will be defined to mean investment that is made in attempting to 
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1 Katherine Hamilton et al, Fortifying the Foundation: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2009 
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mitigate or adapt to climate change made as a result of regulation (compliance frameworks) 
or made voluntarily.   
Global compliance carbon markets are experiencing a period of growth despite factors such 
as the global financial crisis and policy uncertainty post 2012.  In 2008, the global 
compliance climate market exceeded $100 billion, which was a significant increase from 
2007 figures in which the market was valued at $64 billion.2  The voluntary carbon market 
was valued at $705 million in 2008 which again was a significant growth from the 2007 
figure of $335 million.3  The compliance market is currently larger than the voluntary market.  
However the level of economic investment in forest related carbon activities is much more 
significant in voluntary markets compared with investments made in compliance markets.  
73% or 15MtCo2 of forest carbon investments have occurred as a result of voluntary carbon 
markets.4 
While investment in forest carbon projects is more significant in economic terms in voluntary 
markets – investments in forest related activities only account for 3% of all project activities 
(1% avoided deforestation, 1% afforestation/reforestation and 1% sustainable forest 
management).5  Investments in forest carbon projects are seen as cheaper alternatives to 
reducing global GHG emissions compared with investments required to achieve the same 
results in the energy sector.  An investment of $20 billion could cut global emissions by 
0.5GT C.6 This realisation along with an existing global interest in protecting old growth 
forest has sparked considerable interest in the advancement of global policy on paying 
countries for avoided deforestation (known as the REDD mechanism – Reduced Emissions 
from Deforestation and Degradation).  This paper seeks to explore 2 issues: 
• Why do voluntary markets have more investment in forest projects then compliance 
markets? 
• What are the challenges/ barriers preventing increased investment in forest projects 
under compliance and voluntary markets?   
This research builds on existing literature which examines the methodological and equity 
issues associated with designing and implementing internationally funded forest projects in 
developing countries.    There is a growing abundance of literature discussing methodology 
related issues for REDD and REDD plus.7  This literature is of relevance to all investments 
arising in forests as a result of international carbon markets.  This is because the same issues 
are present in all forest investment projects regardless of the source of funding and its 
requirements.  REDD has attracted more attention in the literature as it first international 
forest instrument which promises to deliver improved forest outcomes with a source of 
funding to do so.      
Blom et al, describe the transition of the concept of REDD into REDD-Plus succinctly:  
                                                            
2 Nina Kozlecka and Julien Paulou, Carbon Funds Outlook, ICF International (2009), 7. 
3 Hamilton, above n1, iii.  
4 Katherine Hamilton, Unna Chokkalingham and Maria Bendana, State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2009: 
Taking Root and Branching Out, Ecosystem Marketplace (2010), 3. 
5 Hamilton, above n1, iv.  
6 Alan Grainger et al, ‘Biodiversity and REDD at Copenhagen’ (19) 21 Current Biology 974, 975.  
7 Bruce Campbell, ‘Beyond Copenhagen: REDD+, agriculture, adaption strategies and poverty’ (2010) 19 
Global Environmental Change 397 discusses the advantages that a REDD+ mechanism could deliver for 
alleviating poverty, improving governance, conserving biodiversity and providing other environmental services.    
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REDD as originally intended to incentivise reduced carbon emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation.  REDD-plus is seen as providing incentives for 
increases in carbon stocks and allows for emissions reduction credits from a wider 
array of forest management practices.8   
Ghazoul et al identify the following issues as key challenges facing REDD implementation: 
ethical dilemmas, additionality, system leakages, permanence, national sovereignty and 
native land rights, equity and crashing carbon market.9  Griffiths report highlights the 
importance of free, prior and informed consent as a foundational requirement for any 
international forest carbon investments in areas with community forest interests.10  These 
same issues arise in the creation of any environmental offset schemes11 and the resolution of 
such issues is crucial in determining the long term viability and environmental integrity of 
such schemes.12   
Good forest governance is also identified as a crucial requirement in order to foster 
international carbon investment in forest projects.  Phelps et al identified good forest 
governance arrangements as the crucial factor when deciding upon location for REDD 
investment.13  Good forest governance requires government inclusiveness, accountability, 
participation of civil society, fair and clean tenure rights, legal clarity and control, inter-
sectoral linkages, effective delegation among government levels and provisions of adequate 
resources for managers.  In relation to REDD investment the existence of a strong legal 
framework, tenure clarity and domestic stakeholder engagement are seen as the important 
factors to provide investor confidence. It is suggested that these factors are so significant for 
REDD investors that investments are likely to be higher in countries with stronger 
governance capacities and lower carbon values over projects in countries with high carbon 
values and low governance capabilities. 14 
Another factor identified as being crucial from an investor’s perspective is the development 
of risk mitigation and risk transfer clauses within forest carbon frameworks.15  Buyers will 
generally be more interested in low-risk projects.  Risk in such projects is usually defined and 
transferred within contractual liability provisions and in the context of REDD risk is 
associated with the non-permanence of emissions reduction and the concept of leakage.  The 
more liability taken on by a seller the more attractive the credits become to a buyer.  More 
attractive credits will fetch higher prices.  The concept of risk mitigation highlights the 
competing interests and perspectives prevalent  in international forest carbon interests.  Such 
interests include those of the local community, those concerned with environmental integrity 
and those concerned with a secure and low-risk economic investment.      
                                                            
8 Benjamin Blom, Terry Sunderland and Daniel Murdiyarso, ‘Getting REDD to wok: lessons learned from 
integrated conservation and development projects’ (2010) 13 Environmental Science and Policy, 164, 165.  
9 Jaboury Ghazoul et al, ‘REDD: a reckoning of environment and development implications’ Trends in Ecology 
and Evolution (In Press).   
10Tom Griffiths, Seeing ‘REDD’? Forests, climate change mitigation and the rights of indigenous peoples and 
local communities,  Forest Peoples Programme (2008), 27.    
11 In the context of environmental offsetting and methodology issues see Rowena Maguire, ‘Legal Issues in the 
Design and Implementation of Environmental Offset and Environmental Trading Frameworks’ (2008-2009) 14 
(64) Queensland Environmental Practice Reporter, 53.   
12 For a perspective on the forest methodology issues arising under the Clean Development Mechanism see  
Joyotee Smith and Grahame Applegate, ‘ Could payments for forest carbon contribute to improved tropical 
forest management?’ (2004) 6 Forest Policy and Economics, 153.    
13 J Phelps et al, ‘What makes a ‘REDD’ country?’ (2010) 20 Global Environmental Change, 322. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Meridian Institute, Fostering Carbon Markets Investments in REDD: Final Report, ICF International (2009), 
5.  
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Similarly, a body of literature has emerged examining the impact of international forest 
instruments on local communities and the impact upon their access and use rights as a result 
of such schemes.16  The concept of environmental justice provides a theoretical platform for 
arguing for a moral and ethical approach to be adopted when developing international forest 
instruments.17  within the literature which argue that there is moral obligation on the part of 
the global community to design REDD in way that is equitable for poor, forest-dwelling 
communities.18 Experience from implementing other international forest projects suggests 
that the interests of forest-dependent communities such as short-term livelihood 
improvements are not always compatible with the long term objectives of forest 
conservation.19   
Smith and Scherr find that community based forest projects generated under the clean 
development mechanism such as agroforestry, small –scale plantations, community forest 
rehabilitation and multiple-use forest management have the highest potential for delivering 
benefits to local people.  While it is found that large–scale industrial plantations and strict 
forest protection pose risks for continued community access to land and traditional use 
rights.20  This again demonstrates the competing values and interests associated with 
international forest carbon instruments.     
Compliance Markets 
The international obligations underpinning compliance markets arise from the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol.  In terms of forestry the 
following instruments are relevant: 
• The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; 
• The Kyoto Protocol and associated instruments 
o Clean Development Mechanism guidelines 
o Land Use, Land –Use Change and Forestry guidelines 
• Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation Instrument 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
The UNFCCC does not place any specific obligations on countries.  Instead it lays down the 
foundational governance structure for the international climate change regime.  This includes 
creating key principles and broad commitments and creating a number of technical and 
administrative bodies to implement the convention.  The overarching objective of the 
Convention is found in article 2 and requires 
“the stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropocentric interference with the climate system.  Such 
a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt 
                                                            
16 Simone Lovera et al, The hottest REDD issues: Rights, equity, development, deforestation and Governance by 
Indigenous People and Local Communities, Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policies of 
the IUCN, (2009).   
17 Environmental justice is a concept which requires consideration of the benefits and burdens of an 
environmental activity on the population affected by the implementation of the project.  On the general concept 
of environmental justice see Klaus Bosselman, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and 
Governance, (2008).   
18 Blom et al, above n6, 166.  
19 Blom et al, above n 6, 166.  
20 Joyotee Smith and Sara Scherr, ‘Capturing the Value of Forest Carbon for Local Livelihoods’ (2003) 31 (12) 
World Development, 2143, 2156.  
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naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to 
enable economic development to proceed in a suitable manner”      
Article 4 of the convention creates an obligation in relation to forest areas.  Forests are 
recognised within this article for their ‘sink value’ that is for their ability to store carbon.   
The article does not specify how forests are to be managed rather just identifying the role that 
all sink processes play in lowering greenhouse gas emissions.  The article requires parties to 
“promote sustainable management, and promote and cooperate in the conservation 
and enhancement, as appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not 
controlled by the Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans, as well as 
other terrestrial coastal and marine ecosystems”. 
Forest-dependent developing countries are also given special recognition under the 
Convention.  Article 4 (8) (c) requires the parties to consider the impact of the Convention’s 
obligations on developing countries with forested areas.  It encourages funding, insurance and 
technology transfer to be given to these countries.  The reasoning underlying this obligation 
would be the otherwise unfair burden that forest-dependent developing countries would face 
in addressing concerns related to climate change.  It should be restated at this point that 
developing countries do not have binding commitments under the Convention. This Article is 
merely recognising the unfair burden that forest dependent developing countries may face in 
future initiatives to combat climate change.  
 Article 11 of the Convention directs the conference of parties (the body charged with 
overseeing the implementation of the convention) to create a financial mechanism to assist 
with implementing activities reducing green house gas emissions.  In practice the financial 
mechanism has taken the form of market regulation.  Market regulation places an economic 
value upon environmental services and creates a framework in which this environmental 
value can be traded.    
The Kyoto Protocol 
The Kyoto Protocol is the instrument which establishes international commitments 
concerning climate change by setting binding individual targets to member countries. 
Implementation of the Protocol affects most major sectors of the global economy.21 For this 
reason, the Protocol is thought to be the most far-reaching instrument in existence, creating 
enforceable obligations geared towards achieving environmental and sustainability 
objectives.  Article 3 of the Protocol sets a specific target for the first operational period of 
the Protocol.  The first operational (commitment) period is from 2008-2012.   
The overall goal of the Protocol is to reduce developed countries’ emissions by 5.2% from 
1990 levels.  In order to achieve this Annex I parties22 are allocated a certain number of 
Assigned Amount Units for the 2008-2012 period.  Each assigned amount unit represents a 
right to emit one tonne of carbon dioxide or equivalent.  If parties exceed their allocated 
                                                            
21 Ross Garnaut, The Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008). 
22 The UNFCCC creates 3 levels of membership.  Annex I countries are those countries responsible fore 
creating a regulatory domestic framework aimed at controlling their emission output.  These parties are 
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, European 
Economic Community, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Latvia, Lichtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United 
Kingdom of Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America  
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assigned amount units, they can create additional assigned amount units by using one of the 
three flexibility mechanisms listed below: 
• Article 17 creates emission trading schemes.  These schemes allow countries with 
spare Assigned Amount Units to trade these units with countries who require 
additional Assigned Amount Units.   
• Article 12 creates the clean development mechanism.  This mechanism allows 
countries to implement emission reduction projects in developing countries.  This is 
thought to provide dual benefits in reducing project costs for investing countries and 
allowing for the development of emission friendly practices in developing countries.     
• Article 6 creates joint implementation.  This mechanism allows Annex B countries 
(basically industrialised countries) to invest in projects in other Annex B countries.  
Again this is thought to provide flexibility in terms of the cost of the projects and the 
benefits of technology transfer.   
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol defines the role of forests in climate change mitigation.  
Under Article 3 of the Protocol parties are able to take into account the effect of domestic 
forest activities within their emission calculations.   This allows parties to meet their specified 
target of greenhouse gas reduction by including reductions that occur as a result of forestry 
activities.  This therefore rewards parties that carry out practices to enhance the sustainable 
management of their forest areas.  This section also requires that parties account for emission 
changes resulting from deforestation.  Therefore, this section requires accounting of forest 
activities that act as sinks greenhouse gas emissions and accounting of forest activities that 
act as sources of greenhouse gas emissions. 
The inclusion of forest activities within the Kyoto regime proved to be controversial due to 
concerns related to scale, permanence and additionality, leakage and double counting.23  
• Scale: concern that forest projects cheaper to implement compared with 
clean/renewable energy projects; 
• Permanence: scientific uncertainty surrounding the duration and level of carbon 
sequestered in forests, soils and other vegetation;    
• Additionality: concept which ensures that credits are only given for practices which 
go above business as usual.  Concern that forest credits would be created to reward 
parties who undertook no additional carbon reduction activities.  
• Leakage: concern that improved forest activity in one area, may result in 
unsustainable practice taking place in another area.  
• Double Counting: credits being sold to more then one purchaser.      
As a result of these concerns the Land-Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry Guidelines were 
created along with special rules for forest clean development mechanism projects.  The Land-
Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry guidelines were created for States to use when 
accounting for the sink and source value of forest activities in their jurisdiction.  The 
complicated nature of these rules means that most countries have decided to exclude 
agricultural practices (which include forestry practices) from domestic emission trading 
                                                            
23 Ian Fry, ‘Twists and Turns in the Jungle: Exploring the Evolution of Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry Decisions within the Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11(2) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 159 
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regimes.  Therefore the sink/source value of forest practices is not included by countries 
when reporting to the convention.24    
A number of special rules were introduced for forest clean development projects.25 Certified 
emission reduction credits generated from afforesatation or reforestation activities are 
different from the other credits generated under the clean development mechanism.  The most 
significant difference between clean development afforesatation and reforestation projects 
and energy- related clean development mechanism projects is the temporary nature of carbon 
storage in forest projects.  In order to recognise the non-permanent nature of carbon storage 
in terrestrial carbon stocks, new categories of certified emission reduction credits were 
devised.   Two categories of credits can be generated from afforesatation and reforestation 
activities:26 
 Temporary certified emission reduction credits; and 
 Long term certified emission reduction credits. 
Temporary certified emission reduction credits have to be replaced every five years.    Long-
term certified emission reduction credits have a lifespan of 60 years, but still must be verified 
every five years.  The non-permanence issues increase the transaction cost of afforesatation 
and reforestation credits.  Temporary credits have to be replaced at the end of the five year 
life span. Depending on the market value of other available credits at the end of the credit’s 
lifespan, this may work be financially unfeasible (because credit price may increase 
significantly in the future).  This therefore acts as a disincentive against investing in sink 
credits under the clean development mechanism.   
While the long-term credits have a more extended life span, they still need to replaced at the 
end of the lifespan.  The longer life span may mean that, when the purchase of the 
replacement credits takes place, the price of the replacement credits is much more expensive.  
Additionally, the verification process every five years will also involve transaction costs.  
Comparatively, credits generated from energy activities do not suffer the permanence issues 
and, as such, may require higher up-front investment.  However, overall they may be viewed 
as a more preferable way to meet emission reduction targets.   
Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation  
Forest activities under the Kyoto Protocol are restricted to afforesatation and reforestation.  
The purpose of an avoided deforestation mechanism is to provide incentives to developing 
countries to decrease the level of deforestation occurring at unsustainable levels.  This 
mechanism would be prohibitive because it restricts the sovereign use of parties’ land.  In 
                                                            
24 This allowed due to the existence of Article 3 (4) of the Kyoto Protocol. Article 3 (4) of the Protocol allows 
parties to opt in or opt out of its requirements.  Under this article, Parties may include in their accounting 
practices greenhouse gas emission sources that occur as a result of land-use change and forestry categories and 
agricultural practices.  Again within this section, Parties are required to account for source and sink emissions 
resulting from these practices.  Therefore, it is voluntary for parties to report upon sink/source values of forest 
areas (due to the complexity associated with measuring and reporting, most parties have opted out of reporting 
upon this activities).  
25 For more information see Patrick Graichen, ‘Can Forestry Gain from Emissions Trading? Rules Governing 
Sinks Projects Under the UNFCCC and the EU Emissions Trading System’ (2005) 14 (1) Review of the 
European Community and International Environmental Law 11, and Greg Milner-White ‘The Legal 
Implications of Climate Change in New Zealand for the Forestry Industry’ (2007) 11 New Zealand Journal of 
Environmental Law, 141. 
26 Kenneth Rosenbaum, Dieter Schone, Ali Mekouar, ‘Climate Change and the Forest Sector: Possible national 
and subnational legislation’ (FAO Working Paper No 144, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 2004) 17. 
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some instances, parties may have to improve the remaining forest estate and this will attract 
positive obligations of management.  Designing a regulatory framework which rewards 
parties for not cutting down trees has involved consideration of a number of legal issues - 
with many of these issues remaining unresolved.   
The inclusion of ‘avoided deforestation’ has remained unresolved due to the existence of 
party interests. Advocates for avoided deforestation base their argument around the 
significant contribution that deforestation plays in global emission levels (estimated to be 
around 10-25%)27.  Parties in favour of avoided deforestation use these estimates to 
demonstrate the need for incentives to reward parties that decrease their level of 
deforestation.  Opponents to the ‘avoided deforestation’ idea acknowledge the significant 
contribution that deforestation plays in global emissions levels but remain unconvinced that a 
sound scientific and regulatory framework can be created to deal with the complex nature of 
issues raised by ‘avoided deforestation’ negotiations.  These issues include that of 
permanence, measurement, additionality, undermining the carbon market, sovereignty, and 
leakage.28 In order to include avoided deforestation within existing Kyoto markets, the above 
six issues must be resolved. 
As with all Kyoto forest negotiations the issue of permanence arises.  In relation to avoided 
deforestation and degradation, permanence concerns are warranted.29  This is because 
ensuring the existence of forest areas in perpetuity has proven to be challenging in developing 
countries.  This is due to a wide range of factors related to the underlying causes of forest 
deforestation and degradation.  Countries may over-estimate their ability to control 
deforestation, and history has indicated that deforestation is a complex problem to address.  
There are some means which can be used to account for non-permanence; these include 
various insurance options, renewal or temporary crediting, and banking carbon credits as a 
risk buffer.30 
The concept of “leakage” perhaps presents the most formidable challenge for avoided 
deforestation regimes.  Leakage occurs when mitigation actions in one area may result, 
directly or indirectly, in emission increases in another area.31  In the avoided deforestation 
context, this is a real threat as deforestation may be displaced, and rewarding the initial 
avoided deforestation is pointless if the deforestation occurs in another location.  Certain 
developing nations may prove to have superior capacity conditions for implementing Kyoto 
forest projects and, as such, deforestation activities may then be transferred to countries with 
weaker capacity - resulting in no net global gain in emission reductions.32 Without adequate 
                                                            
27 The Stern Review estimates 18%.  See N. Stern, Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (2006) 
Office of Climate Change United Kingdom http://www.occ.gov.uk/activities/stern.htm at 26 November 2008. 
28Ian Fry, ‘Twists and Turns in the Jungle: Exploring the Evolution of Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
Decisions within the Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11(2) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 159, 161172.  Also see Review of the European Community and International 
Environmental Law 166 and M Skutsch et al, ‘Clearing the way for reducing emissions from tropical 
deforestation’ (2007) 10 Environmental Science and Policy 322, 329-330. 
29 Ibid, 329. 
30 Ian Fry, ‘Twists and Turns in the Jungle: Exploring the Evolution of Land Use, Land-Use Change and 
Forestry Decisions within the Kyoto Protocol’ (2002) 11(2) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 159, 161172. 
31 Ibid,, 173, and Martin Jung, ‘The role of forestry projects in the clean development mechanism’ (2005) 8 
Environmental Science and Policy 87. 
32 P Combes Motel, R Pirard, and JL Combes, ‘ A methodology to estimate impacts of domestic policies on 
deforestation: Compensated Successful Efforts for “avoided deforestation” (REDD)’ (2008) Ecological 
Economics (In Press) 
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safeguards within the international timber market requiring the provision of sustainability 
grown timber, global demand for wood products will contribute to leakage concerns.   
Barriers preventing investment in forest compliance markets 
Policy barriers arising from technical issues associated with recognising carbon credits in 
forest areas means that there has been very limited use of forest carbon credits within 
compliance markets.  The following issues are preventing wider implementation of forest 
carbon credit investment:  
• The complex nature of article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol and the associated Land-Use, 
Land-Use Change and Forestry Guidelines means that most domestic emission 
trading regimes have opted out of accounting for sink and source values of 
agricultural emissions.  Future developments within the international regime may see 
the introduction of a requirement to account for sink and source value of agricultural 
emissions which would drive and increase in demand for carbon credits generated 
from forest activities.   
• The temporary nature of forest credits generated under the Clean Development 
Mechanism acts as a major disincentive for investors.  In order to increase 
investment in forest projects under the Clean Development Mechanism some type of 
incentive may need to be offered to investors. 
• It is anticipated that the Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation 
(REDD) instrument will drive significant investment in forest conservation.  The 
major barrier in this regard is the slow development of REDD policy. 
• Compliance market policy is in state a flux.  It is possible that significant policy 
change may occur after the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol finishes in 
2012.  This uncertainty may be leading to forest investments in voluntary markets in 
which policy requirements are not time specific.33    
• Developing property rights in carbon credits remains the predominant issue from a 
legal perspective.  Buyers of carbon credits want secured interests which are often 
achieved by recognising the carbon credit as a property interest.  Many jurisdictions 
are still developing laws to recognise this.34 
Voluntary Markets 
Ecosystem marketplace defines voluntary carbon markets as all markets that trade in carbon 
offsets that are not required by regulation.  Voluntary carbon markets can be broken into two 
distinct groups: the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) which is a voluntary but legally 
binding cap and trade system and the broader, non-binding ‘over the counter offset market’ 
(OTC).   As outlined above issues surrounding permanence, leakage and additionality have 
increased the complexity of the compliance market approach to regulating forest carbon 
credits.  As such, most forest carbon credits have been created in the voluntary market.  The 
                                                            
33 Kozlecka and Paulo, above n 2 , 4.  
34 For further information on this see  Michelle Pasero, ‘The Nature of the Rights of Interest Created by a 
Market for Forest Carbon’ (2008) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 248, Charlotte Streck, ‘Forests, Carbon 
Markets, and Avoided Deforestation: Legal Implications’ (2008) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 239 and 
Peter Lough,  Alastair Cameron, ‘ Forestry in the New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme: Design and 
Prospects for Success’ (2008) 3 Carbon and Climate Law Review 281 .    In the African context Jon Unruh, 
‘Carbon sequestration in Africa: The land tenure problem’ (2008) 18 Global Environmental Change 700 
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table below gives a breakdown of the volume of carbon sequestered by forest carbon credits 
and economic value of these credits in the compliance and voluntary frameworks.35  
Table 1.1: Comparison of investment in forest carbon in compliance and voluntary markets  
Volume Sequestered 
(MT Co2) 
Economic Value 
(USD) $ 
Market 
Historical Total 2008 Historical Total 2008 
 
Compliance 
(Kyoto) 
 
 
2.9 
 
0.2 
 
$11.6 
 
$0.3 
 
Voluntary 
(CCX and 
OTC) 
 
 
17.9 
 
5.0 
 
$137.6 
 
$36.8 
 
This table demonstrates that in the forest context the operation of voluntary markets is far 
more significant in terms of providing funding for sustainable forest management.  A range 
of forest management activities can be used to generate voluntary forest credits.  A report 
complied by Ecosystem Marketplace found that the majority of credits related to 
afforesatation and reforestation activities (63%), followed by Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation at 17% and Improved Forest Management projects at 13%.  There is an 
increase in demand for Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation credits – 
historically 17% moving to 24% in 2008.  This is likely attributable to greater carbon 
sequestration potential of these credits compared with the sequestration value of 
afforesatation/reforestation credits and improved forest management credits. 
It is speculated that voluntary offset market has been popular due to the following factors:36 
• Broad participation: the voluntary carbon market enables those in unregulated sectors 
or countries that not ratified Kyoto, such as the US, to offset their emissions; 
• Preparation for future participation: the voluntary carbon market enables companies to 
gain experience with carbon inventories, emissions reduction and carbon markets.  
• Innovation and Experimentation: the voluntary carbon market is not subject to the 
same level of oversight, management and regulation as the compliance market 
allowing project developers to be more flexible and implement projects that might 
otherwise not be viable (e.g. projects that are too small or too disaggregated). 
• Corporate Goodwill: corporation can benefit from the positive public relations 
associated with the voluntary reduction of emissions.      
Concerns have emerged concerning the quality of credits sold on voluntary carbon markets. 
Ecosystem marketplace acknowledges that proving the legitimacy of carbon offset projects 
                                                            
35 Katherine Hamilton, Unna Chokkalingham and Maria Bendana, State of the Forest Carbon Markets 2009: 
Taking Root and Branching Out, Ecosystem Marketplace (2010), 2. 
36 Anja Kollmuss, Helge Zink and Clifford Polycarp, Making Sense of the Voluntary Carbon Market: A 
comparison of Carbon Offset Standards, World Wide Fund for Nature, Stockholm Environment Institute and 
TRICORONA, (2008). 
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remains a major issue in the marketplace for voluntary markets.37 Scientists have raised 
questions about the legitimacy and permanence of certain credit generating activities.38  In 
addition to this there is some evidence that there are not enough credits to satisfy demand 
which might encourage the actions of carbon cowboys.  The term carbon cowboy has been 
used to refer firms which sell outright fraudulent credits resulting from nonexistent 
construction programs, project that provide little environmental benefits or projects which 
double-sell credits to more than one emitter. 39  The CCX has responded to such criticism by 
increasing regulatory auditing processes and the imposition of more stringent standards.40  
Despite these changes, very valid concern remains as the environmental and economic value 
of credits generated in voluntary carbon markets. 
A report has been prepared comparing the verification processes of a number of voluntary 
carbon providers against the requirements of compliance market in particular the 
requirements of the Clean Development Mechanism.41  All standards analysed are compatible 
with the requirements of the Clean Development Mechanism.  Most standards have similar 
requirements to the Clean Development Mechanism there are degrees of variation in terms of 
the projects covered by the standards, the co-benefits required by the standard and the price 
generated by the standards.42   The standards evaluated against the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) are: 
• Gold Standard; 
• Voluntary Carbon Standard; 
• VER+ 
• The Voluntary Offset Standard; 
• Chicago Climate Exchange; 
• The Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards; 
• Plan Vivo System; 
• ISO 14064 -2 
• GHG Protocol for Project Accounting 
One of the standards assessed is the Voluntary Carbon Standard.  This program seeks to 
verify that carbon offsets are real, additional, measurable, permanent and unique.  The market 
share of the Voluntary Carbon Standard credits is expected to be large.  In terms of assessing 
the creditability of the Voluntary Carbon Standard the following factors accord with CDM 
requirements: additionality requirements, third party verification requirements and the 
existence of a registry.  While the Voluntary Carbon Standard does not have as stringent 
requirements as compared with the CDM for the following factors: separate verification and 
approval processes, the exclusion of projects types which high chances of adverse impacts 
and less requirements for projects with co-benefits to local communities.43     
                                                            
37 Katherine Hamilton et al, Fortifying the Foundation: State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2009, 
Ecosystems Marketplace, (2009), i.  
38 David Greising, ‘The Carbon Frontier’ (2008)  64 (3) Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 32, 33.  
39 Ibid, 34.  
40 Creation of a Gold standard for credits see Bill Eggertson, ‘Mandatory or Voluntary’ (2008) July/August 
Renewable Energy Focus, 32.   
41 Anja Kollmuss, Helge Zink and Clifford Polycarp, Making Sense of the Voluntary Carbon Market: A 
comparison of Carbon Offset Standards, World Wide Fund for Nature, Stockholm Environment Institute and 
TRICORONA, (2008). 
42 Ibid, x. 
43 Ibid.   
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The Voluntary Carbon Standard has created an instrument providing guidance for agriculture, 
forestry and other land use projects.  The instrument recognises four types of forest activities: 
afforestation, reforestation and revegetation (ARR); Agricultural Land Management (ALM), 
Improved Forest Management (IFM) and Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation (REDD).  Verification of carbon forest credits by bodies such as the voluntary 
carbon market will help to overcome concerns about the validity of voluntary carbon credits.  
However, at this stage there are no mandatory provisions regarding verification of voluntary 
carbon forest credits which acts as a disincentive against complying with verifying body 
standards and guidelines.     
Conclusions 
Voluntary carbon markets demonstrate that there is a demand coupled with a willingness to 
pay for forest carbon credits.  This is promising news for those interested in generating funds 
for forest conservation, reforestation, afforesatation and forest management projects.  The 
development of accountable scientific methodologies to measure carbon storage capacity 
along with the development of the regulatory framework creating rules and standards must 
speed up in order to take advantage of this interest to invest in carbon credits.  Some type of 
middle ground needs to be reached between compliance and voluntary systems in which the 
regulatory conditions imposed are not so onerous as to discourage investment, while they are 
stringent enough to ensure environmental and economic efficiency.   
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